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Abstract. Quantum key distribution technologies promise information-theoretic security and are currently being deployed in com-
mercial applications. We review new frontiers in information security technologies in communications and distributed storage
applications with the use of classical, quantum, hybrid classical-quantum, and post-quantum cryptography. We analyze the cur-
rent state-of-the-art, critical characteristics, development trends, and limitations of these techniques for application in enterprise
information protection systems. An approach concerning the selection of practical encryption technologies for enterprises with
branched communication networks is discussed.
Introduction
Universal quantum computers would allow solving certain mathematical problems in a more efficient way in compare
with their classical counterparts. In particular, tasks dealing with integer factorization and discrete logarithm prob-
lems [1]. Therefore, any security protocols, products or security systems [2] that derive security from mathematical
complexities of the above tasks are highly vulnerable to attacks with the use of quantum computer [3]. On the one
hand, a question about the time, which is needed to build of a large-scale quantum computer, remains open. There
are also a number of physical setups that realize different implementations of quantum computing devices such as
superconducting qubits, ultracold atoms, and trapped ions [4]. On the other hand, the fact of the possible appearance
of quantum computer in the near future changes development trends of information security.
Examples of this paradigmatic change include an increase of the attention to security tools that are not vulner-
able to attacks with the use of quantum computer, so-called quantum-safe technologies. Generally speaking, these
techniques can be divided into two classes. The first is based on information-theoretically secure methods since they
make no assumptions about computational resources of an eavesdropper, e.g., one-time pad [5] and Wegman-Carter
authentication [6] schemes. However, the one-time pad scheme requires the establishing secret keys. Remarkably,
the procedure of key distribution can be realized in an efficient manner using individual quantum systems, single
photons [7]. Recent breakthrough in experimental control for quantum systems aimed on a design of quantum key
distribution (QKD) devices for practical usage of the one-time pad scheme has been performed [7]. QKD systems
combining with other cryptographic tools are used in the hybrid classical-quantum encryption systems [8]. Crypto-
graphic devices with QKD are available on the market [8].
The second class of tools is based on computational problems that are currently believed to be hard both for
classical and quantum computing devices. In particular, one can use post-quantum cryptography primitives [9] or
symmetric ciphers like AES (with the use of a quantum-resistant key distribution scheme), since the cipher can adapt
to a quantum attack by increasing its key size to rectify a vulnerability introduced by quantum computing.
The main goal of the paper is to analyze critical characteristics, trends, and limitations of these technologies.
We stress on application of practical cryptographic tools in enterprise security systems. It is clear that typically such
security systems deal with information of varying degrees of importance. Therefore, it is useful to consider selecting,
which proper cryptographic techniques aimed on different applications such as secure communications and distributed
storage. Due to increasing of possibilities for data storage during last decades, analysis of development trends is
especially important for long-term security in the view of “store now— decrypt later” paradigm, in which we assume
that sensitive data can be stored now in an encrypted form and then decrypted when quantum computers and/or novel
mathematical algorithms are available.
Cryptographic tools: quantum, post-quantum, and hybrid
Since not all cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attacks, there is an increase of the interest to secu-
rity methods providing long-term information protection robust against attacks from quantum computers. As it was
mentioned below, several ways to provide information security using cryptography in the view of appearance of a
universal quantum computer can be used.
Quantum key distribution for information-theoretic secure systems
We start with a description of the use of secret key cryptography in the one-time pad regime with QKD. The operating
of such a method can be described as follows. Two legitimate users (Alice and Bob) have the pre-shared authentication
key and the direct transmitting channel, i.e. Alice and Bob should be point-to-point connected to each other. Then
they establish a QKD session that allows them to obtain a raw quantum key, which contains some errors. In the QKD
security proofs it is assumed that all errors in raw quantum keys are due to eavesdropping [7]. That is why Alice and
Bob use authenticated public channel for the post-processing procedure [10, 11]. After the procedure, Alice and Bob
have a key for applications, and it is proven to be information theoretically secure against arbitrary attacks, including
the quantum ones [12].
We note that the practical usage of the one-time scheme with QKD encounters a number of practical challenges.
First, it is an essential limitation that Alice and Bob should have a direct (fiber or free-space) channel for transmitting of
single photons and authenticated classical channel for information reconciliation. Second one is that the key generation
rate is rather low. It decreases significantly with increasing distance between Alice and Bob due to the optical losses
of photons in optical fibers and the imperfect work of single photon detectors. Towards to overcome this challenge
one needs to develop new generation of single photon sources and detectors. Finally, the post-processing procedure
for information reconciliation includes computationally cost operations, e.g., error correction with low-density parity
check codes [11]. Nevertheless, elusively the one-time pad scheme with QKD is both practical and absolutely secure
tool. This means that even assuming that Eve has unlimited computational resources, classical or quantum, QKD is
always will be secure [7, 12].
Post-quantum cryptography
The second way is to use post-quantum cryptography tools [9]. Such schemes are based on schemes, e.g. code-based,
multivariate, lattice-based, and hash based cryptosystems, for those there are no both classical and quantum efficient
algorithms. Speaking about applications, post-quantum cryptography schemes have performance comparable to or
better than pre-quantum schemes of the same security level. However, key, message, and signature sizes are generally
larger. Furthermore, these schemes can be useful, however they do not guarantee absolute privacy. As well as classical
public-key cryptography primitives these methods are fully non-resistant to “store now — decrypt later” paradigm,
because of an existence of the possibility to invent a “post-quantum computer”.
Hybrid cryptography
Lastly, a useful strategy is combination of different cryptographic techniques. For example, one can combine QKD
with classical block ciphers (hybrid classical-quantum cryptography) with an increase of frequency of the master key
update. This idea is used in commercial QKD devices [8]. Several information security applications allow one also
combine keys distributed using, let say, public-key cryptography and QKD. Hybrid systems such, as systems using
QKD together with the AES algorithm, are quantum-safe.
Let us consider a simple model of a hybrid classical-quantum system. In a classical part, one has a master key
KM , which is installed at starting point of the system, and session key KS obtaining with the use of non-quantum-safe
tools. Alice and Bob use a function d(KM ,KS ,M) to encrypt a message M. Using parameters of keys KM and KS one
can estimate the time of information being secure TS in the view of possible attacks. A quantum part of hybrid systems
consist of upgrade of the master key KM with a frequency f by using a key KQ from quantum-safe key distribution
scheme (e.g., QKD) as follows: KM+1 = g(KM,KQ). Therefore, in the hybrid system one has d(g(KM,KQ),KS ,M) for
encryptionmessages, and the time of information being secure TS+Q( f ) > TS , and it is a function of the frequency f of
the master key upgrade. It is an important problem to find an algorithm, which allows one to obtain a good estimation
for the time TS+Q( f ).
Another interesting idea is to combine QKD with classical approaches for authentication, e.g., as in the floating
bases protocol for QKD [13, 14]. Not only quantum key can be applied to the classical cryptography but also classical
algorithms become stronger being moved to the quantum world. In the classical world the large computational power
threats the transmitted data by the “store now — decrypt later” attack. In the quantum case even interception of the
signal does not give all information because of the measurement properties. This approach was also used in quantum
data transmission [15] and quantum authentication [16]. The quantum authentication its one of directions where low
bit rate of quantum channels can be applied for corporate needs.
Cryptography in enterprise security systems
We expect that enterprises information protection strategies will transform under influence of emerging quantum
computers. There is no single universal standard for encrypting all data today and in the post-quantum era enterprises,
governments, and public institutions will be challenged by similar tradeoffs while defining an effective strategy.
Complete transition of all encryption system users to quantum resistant encryption will not happen in a moment,
new standards and products resistant to quantum computing techniques will evolve along the time, but organizations
today already should design their information protection tools considering the upcoming quantum resistant algorithm
transition. Ref. [3] gives an estimation for the time: If a large-scale quantum computer (time – z) is built before the
infrastructure has been re-tooled to be quantum-safe and the required duration of information-security has passed
(time – x + y), then the encrypted information will not be secure, leaving it vulnerable to adversarial attack. It is
then important to note that time estimate for making our IT infrastructure quantum-safe should include work on
standardization of quantum-safe and hybrid encryption tools.
A proper encryption strategy should depend on the sensitivity of organizations information, data storage and
transmission methods. Before selecting adequate encryption tool organizations have to determine subjects of encryp-
tion and plan an encryption program as a part of an overall enterprise risk management and data governance program.
We have in mind a simple model of an organization with a number N of distinct branches.
Selection of encryption technology is always made under various constraints, including legal, technological,
financial, and organizational and a carefully planned, comprehensive approach that considers specifically which data
should be encrypted and how will generate greater efficiency and effectiveness for the organization. We denote C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cM} as a set classifying the information in an organization, where c1 is a class of open (public) information
and cM stands for the most critical information. We assume that the cost of information is significantly higher that the
cost of implementation of quantum-safe tools.
Another dimension that organization should take into account while planning their emerging encryption strate-
gies is how the data will be protected throughout its lifecycle. It is therefore important to consider the state of the data
under protection: data being transmitted over a network, data at rest, or data in the process of being generated, up-
dated, erased, or viewed. Each of these states presents unique challenges and significantly influence what encryption
technique is going to be used to secure data. We denote T = {t1, t2, , tK} as a set of time classes of the information,
where t1 denotes the class of information, which should be private during only one time period of its lifecycle, and tK
stands for the information class, which should be private during whole lifecycle.
Protecting data at rest is a critical issue as the network perimeter continues to dissolve. Major encryption types
for data-at-rest include full disk encryption, hardware security module, encrypting file system, files and databases for
protecting structured and unstructured data. Encryption types for data-in-motion include network protected access
and server communications. Cloud computing has created the need to secure data in use as third-party providers
increasingly host and process data. The data-in-use is the hardest to protect, since it almost always has to be decrypted
and therefore exposed in order to be used. Specifically, this challenge is related to decryption keys, which must be
completely unavailable to an attacker in order for encryption to provide security therefore protecting an environment
where keys are stored is critical to address in an encryption strategy.
It was mentioned previously that encryption should be a part of a broader security strategy of an organization
and effective data classification is crucial for enabling resilient data protection capabilities for the organization. Data
mapping exercise should done and take into account where information is stored ensuring that data in all locations
such as mobile devices, backup systems and cloud services will be properly protected. Another challenge, which
highlights the importance of data classification, is that appearance of a large-scale quantum computer may put at risk
data encrypted by non-quantum resistant algorithms, which have significant long-term value along its lifecycle before
retirement.
On the basis of the analysis of critical characteristics, development trends, and limitations of these techniques
for application in enterprise security systems we propose a framework for making practical trade off. The proposed
framework gives trivial answers for the limit cases. First, if data has the lowest class from the sets C and T , then one
can use the simplest and cheapest method for the protection. Second, if the considered information has the highest
class from the sets C and T , then one has to use quantum-safe systems such as QKD. In the other cases, one can use
hybrid encryption methods with different parameters. It is possible to choose proper parameters of the used hybrid
systems, such as the size of keys (master, quantum, and session) and the master key upgrade frequency, to realize
practical trade offs.
Architecture of networks: Many-to-one hybrid systems
Here we suggest combining of all different encryption techniques with taking into account their critical characteristics,
development trends, and limitations of these technologies in special network architecture. It can be directly integrated
in enterprise security systems.
On the top of the considered above information characteristics, one should note a network topology of the con-
sidered organization. Using of quantum-safe security tools based on QKD require a direct channel communication
channel. We begin with main challenges of the QKD methods in the view of constructing networks (the main chal-
lenges are considered above). Even in a network realization, QKD is a point-to-point technology. Speaking on the
physical level, this means that each single photon sources should be connected to a detector by a fiber (or free space)
channel as well authenticated public channel for post-processing procedures. Despite the fact that QKD allows obtain-
ing of symmetric key, one can note an ‘asymmetry’ in costs of QKD hardware. Typically, the cost of Bob apparatus
is higher, and it requires additional infrastructure (e.g., in the case of using SSPD detectors). On the other hand, it is
possible to use Bob apparatus in a multichannel regime. Another limitation of QKD comes from computationally cost
operation for post-processing procedures.
To overcome challenges, one can suggest the following network architecture. Assume that the Bob apparatus is
located in a data center of the company, and Alice’s (branches) are connected to it channel for quantum safe, hybrid,
or non-quantum safe information protection applications. Such a scheme allows one to create the proper infrastructure
for the best QKD hardware (SSPD). It would help to use computational resources of the companys data-center for the
post-processing procedure for information reconciliation. If for two branches Ai and A j have there is direct channel
for QKD to the companys data center, then effectively there is secure communication between them. We think such a
paradigm can be easily integrated in enterprise security systems.
The suggested approach also allows using of QKD for information protection in distributed storage protocols.
The protection of the transmitted data is an obvious application for quantum technologies. Low time of quantum state
life makes it not obvious for data at rest protection. Protect the data at rest and data in transfer appears to be like yin
and yang. One of the strongest ways to protect data at rest is the proactive secret sharing between several locations
using the HJKY 95 protocol [17]. While there is still threat of attack in some period of time of one location, the secret
data has to be re-shared. To achieve the maximum protection this scheme requires QKD.
Quantum computing technologies pose a significant threat to information security products based on another
important emerging technology— blockchain [18]. Recently, a possible solution to the quantum-era blockchain chal-
lenge was suggested [19].
If we look in the more distant future the even data in process can be processed without decryption. There are
number of conceptual works where quantum computer can process data even without knowing what is this data about.
The untrusted computation can make processor time a 100% service.
Conclusion and outlook
Quantum computing is an increasingly hot area for investments both from government and large companies, e.g.
Google and Microsoft. One can then think that post-quantum era is coming even faster than it is expected. Thus,
the actual need in quantum-safe security mechanism at least in some applications is clear today. To summarize,
we introduced the approach for selecting proper cryptographic techniques for enterprise security systems dealing
with information of varying degrees of importance. We proposed the approach for building networks architecture
allowing efficient combining of different cryptographic techniques both for communications and distributed storage
technologies.
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